The provision providing that a decision by the Latvian Prison Administration is not subject to appeal complies with the Satversme

11.06.2014.

On 10 June 2014 the Constitutional Court passed the judgement in Case No. 2013-18-01 “On the Compliance of the Sixth Sentence of Section 563 (3) of The Sentence Execution Code of Latvia with the First Sentence of Article 92 of the Satversme of the Republic of Latvia”.

The decision by the Latvian Prison Administration regarding employment of a convicted person outside the facility for deprivation of liberty shall not be transferred under an administrative court’s control

The Contested Norm  (in italics)

Section 563 of The Sentence Execution Code of Latvia sets out the procedure according to which a convicted person may receive a permission to be employed for remuneration, envisaging that an order by the head of the facility for the deprivation of liberty is needed. If this order contains a refusal to allow employment of a convicted person, the order may be contested to the Latvian Prison Administration. Whereas, The Decisions of the Latvian Prison Administration is not subject to appeal.

The Norm of Higher Legal Force

The first sentence of Article 92 of the Satversme: “Everyone has the right to defend his or her rights and lawful interests in a fair court.”

The Facts

The case was initiated having regard to Mārtiņš Ēcis constitutional complaint. Mārtiņš Ēcis has asked a permission to work outside the prison territory, however, it was refused. He is of the opinion that the contested norm, which prohibits appealing against a decision by the Prison Administration, disproportionally restricts his right to a fair court.

The Court Findings and Ruling

On the scope of reviewing the contested norm

The Constitutional Court noted that, when reviewing a case having regard to a person’s constitutional complaint, its task was to review the constitutionality of a norm, which had actually infringed upon a person’s fundamental rights. In this case the actual circumstances, under which the norm infringed upon the applicant’s fundamental rights, are essential. Hence, the Constitutional Court reviewed the contested norm insofar it applied to employing convicted persons outside the facility for deprivation of liberty. [10]

On the infringement upon a person’s fundamental rights

The Constitutional Court noted that the contested norm should be examined in interconnection with Administrative Procedure Law, i.e., it must be established, whether a decision by the Prison Administration should be recognised as being an administrative act. The Constitutional Court assessed, whether the decision by Administration was adopted with regard to a person particularly subject to the institution and whether it significantly infringed upon the fundamental rights. [11]

The Constitutional Court recognised that an imprisoned person was a person particularly subject to the institution – the facility for deprivation of liberty. [11.1]

The Constitutional Court assessed, whether the decision by the Prison Administration significantly infringed upon a person’s fundamental rights set out in Article 106 of the Satversme  – the right to freely choose their employment and workplace. [12] The Court found that these fundamental rights pertained to imprisoned persons only insofar the exercise of these rights could be compatible with the regime and aim of execution of sentence. Article 106 of the Satversme does not comprise the right of imprisoned persons to freely choose workplace outside the facility for deprivation of liberty. [12.2]

Moreover, the Constitutional Court established that the applicant had erroneously assumed that The Sentence Execution Code of Latvia allowed employment of imprisoned persons outside the territory of prison.  Only those convicted persons, who are serving their sentence in an open prison, can be employed outside the territory of prison. [13.1]

Thus, the Constitutional Court concluded that a decisions by the Prison Administration regarding employment of a convicted person outside the facility for deprivation of liberty did not significantly infringe upon a person’s fundamental rights and thus had to be be recognised as an internal decision of the institution, not an administrative act to be subject to control by an administrative court. [14]

Thus, the Constitutional Court recognised that the contested norm was compatible with the first sentence of Article 92 of the Satversme.

The Judgement is final and not subject to appeal, it comes into force as of the day of its publication.

Linked case: 2013-18-01