Requiring a person subject to administrative proceedings to sign the complaint to be submitted to the court does not preclude the rights of the defence
The Constitutional Court declared compatible with the Constitution the norm which established that the defence counsel of a natural person subject to administrative liability had no right to sign a complaint to be submitted to court. The Court emphasised that the requirement for the person to sign the complaint implements the principle of personal participation enshrined in the Law on Administrative Liability, which contributes to the efficiency of the judicial process and thus ensures the smooth functioning of the democratic state order.
The case was initiated following applications by two natural persons. Applicants who have been fined in administrative offence cases lodged complaints with the courts against decisions of the authorities in administrative offence cases through their lawyers. Yet the courts refused to accept the complaints, arguing that the defence lawyer of an adult natural person does not have the right to sign the complaint on behalf of the person being prosecuted. The applicants applied to the Constitutional Court believing that the contested norm, insofar as it does not provide for the right of the defence counsel of a person held administratively liable to sign and submit a complaint to the court, does not comply with the right to assistance of a lawyer included in the fourth sentence of Article 92 of the Constitution.
The Constitutional Court concluded that in the interests of an effective administrative offence procedure it was necessary that a natural person who was held liable as an adult explained the circumstances of the commission of the offence and provided other information necessary to decide on the case, which was known only to the person himself/herself. In written proceedings, which are the predominant form of proceedings before the courts in administrative offences cases, the signature of the person directly liable ensures his or her personal involvement. By signing the complaint, the signatory certifies that the content of the document corresponds to the will of the person, as well as the will to initiate or continue the administrative offence proceedings in court. The contested norm and the related norms concerning the obligation of a person to personally participate in the examination of a case ensure that the circumstances of committing an administrative offence are confirmed directly by the person held liable, thus implementing the principle of personal participation contained in the Administrative Procedure Law.
The Constitutional Court noted that neither the contested norm nor other norms of the Law on Administrative Liability prevented a natural person who was held liable as an adult from inviting a legal assistance provider of his or her own choice in order to receive assistance from him or her in the preparation, drafting, preparation of a collateral complaint or in the court examination of the complaint. Thus, the fact that a natural person who is an adult who is being held liable has to sign the complaint himself or herself, being personally involved in the administrative offence proceedings, does not generally preclude the right to legal aid provided by a defence counsel.
Taking into account the aforementioned, the Constitutional Court concluded that there were objective and reasonable grounds for the provision in the contested norm that the defence counsel of a natural person held administratively liable had no right to sign a complaint in order to submit it to court. However, the manner in which a natural person who is an adult who has been prosecuted may, with the assistance of a defence counsel, exercise his or her rights of defence in an administrative offence case at the stage of the proceedings, generally ensures that the person has the legal assistance necessary to exercise his or her rights of defence. Therefore, the Constitutional Court found that the contested norm complied with the fourth sentence of Article 92 of the Constitution.
Linked case: 2023-42-01