Judgment
On Behalf of the Republic of
Latvia
Riga, 2 December 2009
in the case No. 2009-07-0103
The
Constitutional Court of the Republic of Latvia, composed of the Chairman of the
Court hearing Gunârs Kűtris,
Justices Kaspars Balodis, Aija Branta, Juris
Jelâgins, Kristîne Krűma and Viktors Skudra,
having regard to the application of Roberts Mutulis,
according
to Article 85 of the Satversme (Constitution) of the Republic of Latvia,
Article 16 1st indent, Article 17 (1), 11th indent,
Article 192 and Article 28.1 of the Constitutional Court Law,
on 10 November 2009 in writing examined the case
“On Compliance of the First Part of Section 74 of the
Sentence Execution Code of Latvia and Para 88 of the 30 May 2006 Cabinet of
Ministers Regulation No. 423 "Regulations Regarding Internal Rules of
Order of Places of Deprivation of Liberty" with Article 96 and Article 104
of the Satversme (Constitution) of the Republic of Latvia”
The Facts
1. On 23 December 1970, the Supreme Council of the Latvian SSR (Latvijas PSR Augstâkâ padome) adopted the Corrective Labour Code. The Decision “On Application of the Latvian
SSR Legislative Acts” of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Latvia adopted
on 29 August 1991 provided that The Latvian SSR Corrective Labour Code shall be
regarded as the Latvian Corrective Labour Code until a new code is elaborated.
On 30 December 1994, the Law “Amendments to the Latvian Corrective Labour Code”
adopted on 25 December 1994 came into force. This Law provided for a new
wording of the title of the Law, namely, the Latvian Penalty Execution Code
(hereinafter – the Code), which is its current title.
The
Second part of Section 74 of the Code provides for the regime in a disciplinary
punishment isolation cell. The first part of the above mentioned Section
provides, according to its effective wording: “Convicted persons who are held
in a disciplinary punishment isolation cell shall not have the right to have
meetings, receive consignments, parcels and postal parcels, to purchase
foodstuffs, send letters to private persons and use table games; they shall
also be prohibited smoking.”
2. Section XIV of 30 May 2006 of the Cabinet
Regulation No. 423 “Regulations
Regarding Internal Rules of Order of Places of Deprivation of Liberty” (hereinafter – Regulation No. 423) regulates
the procedure for application of inducements and disciplinary punishments for
the convicts. The wording of Section 88 of the Regulation No. 423, that was
valid at the time when the case was initiated, provided the following: “The
prohibition established for convicted persons held in a disciplinary punishment
isolation cell to send or receive letters shall not apply to applications and
complaints to the prosecutor’s office or the Head of the Latvian prison
Administration. Based on a request of the convicted person, he or she shall be
provided with stationery and envelopes.”
On
12 May 2009, the Cabinet of Ministers adopted Regulation no. 413 “Amendments to
the 30 May 2006 Cabinet of Ministers Regulations No. 423 “Regulations Regarding Internal Rules of Order of Places
of Deprivation of Liberty””
(hereinafter – Regulation No. 413), that provided for the following wording of
Section 88 of the Regulation No. 423: “Based on a request of a convicted person
held in a disciplinary punishment isolation cell, the place of deprivation of
liberty shall provide them the possibility to send letters, except for sending
letters to private persons, in accordance with the procedure established in the
normative regulatory acts.”
3. The applicant Roberts Mutulis (hereinafter
– the Applicant) holds that the prohibition to send letters included in the
first part of Section 74 of the Code and Section 88 of the Regulation No. 423 (the
wording that was effective before Regulation No. 413 was issued) does not
comply with Article 96 and Article 104 of the Satversme.
Under the Contested Norms, the
convicted persons who are held in a disciplinary punishment isolation cell do
not have the right to send letters to or to receive letters from relatives. Such
way of communication could be restricted and controlled with a view to eliminate
hindrance of criminal investigation, prevent any criminal offence, and protect
crime victims; however convicted persons should be ensured the minimum level of
communication, i.e. the possibility to communicate with relatives. The
prohibition included in the Contested Norms does not have a legitimate
objective. Moreover, any correspondence with relatives is being censored. Thus
planning of new crimes is prevented. Moreover, this gives no benefit to the
society if the convicted person is denied the right to family life.
Persons can exercise the
rights guaranteed in Article 104 of the Satversme by submitting complaints,
applications or suggestions any State or local government institution. Section
88 of the Regulation No. 423 includes a prohibition to communicate with State
authorities. Prosecutor’s office and the Head of the Latvian Prison
Administration are an exception. Decisions issued by authorities usually establish
a term, within which it is possible to contest or appeal these decision. If a
convicted person is held in disciplinary punishment isolation cell, he or she
might be denied the right to contest or appeal against authority’s decision. It
is possible to re-establish the term; however the above mentioned prohibition
shall be regarded as an ungrounded encumbrance. The prohibition to have
correspondence with State authorities does not have a legitimate objective and
therefore the Contested Norms do not comply with Article 104 of the Satversme.
4. The institution that issued the Contested Norm, the
Saeima (Parliament) does not agree with the opinion of the Applicant and
holds that the Contested Norms do comply with Article 96 and Article 104 of the
Satversme
According to the Saeima, the Section
74 (1) of the Code provides for a restriction that applies to sending letters
to private persons; however the Section does not prohibit receiving letters by
convicted persons held in a disciplinary punishment isolation cell. Section 49
(3) of the Code is applicable to convicted persons held in a disciplinary punishment
isolation cell, this Section stating the following: “Letters and telegrams
addressed to convicted persons shall be handed over to them, as well as their
letters and telegrams shall be send to the addressees by the administration of
the place of deprivation of liberty no later than within three days from the
date of reception or passing over of a letter or a telegram.”
Section 74 (1) of the Code
does not restrict the right of convicted persons held in a disciplinary punishment
isolation cell to send letters to State and local government institutions or to
receive letters from the above mentioned institutions and thus does not
infringe the right to
address submissions to State or local government institutions and to receive a
materially responsive reply, as guaranteed
to a person in Article 104 of the Satversme. This norm only includes a
prohibition to send letters to private persons.
Having analysed compliance of the
words “to send letters to private persons” of Section 74 (1) of the Code with
Article 96 of the Satversme, the Saeima indicates that the duty of the State to
help a person in detention to maintain relations with relatives from the right
to private and family life. These rights, however are
not absolute and certain restrictions to the right to inviolability of private
life are justifiable.
The Saeima holds that, when
assessing the legitimate objective and compliance of the restriction included
in the Contested Norm with the principle of proportionality, it is necessary to
take into account the fact that separation of the convicted person from others
by locating him or her in a disciplinary punishment isolation cell and the
stress related thereto is an impermissible feature of a place of deprivation of
liberty.
The duty of the State is to
ensure a good order in a place of deprivation of liberty. One of the
instruments for ensuring it is disciplinary punishment of convicted persons for
breaching the regime. The result of such disciplinary punishment, which is a
lawful objective of restrictions applied, is maintenance of a proper regime in
a place of deprivation of liberty insofar as it protects rights and ensures
security of other convicts and personnel. Section 24.2 of 11 January 2006
Council of Europe Recommendation Rec(2006)2 of the Committee of Ministers to member states
on the European Prison Rules
(hereinafter – the European Prison Rules) provides that communication may be subject to restrictions and monitoring
necessary for the requirements of continuing criminal investigations,
maintenance of good order, safety and security, prevention of criminal offences
and protection of victims of crime. Consequently, the restriction included in
the Contested Norm has a legitimate objective, namely, the objective to protect
constitutional values mentioned in Article 116, which is security of the
society by ensuring observation of good order in places of deprivation of liberty.
Since holding a convicted
person in a disciplinary punishment isolation cell is an exceptional
disciplinary punishment, the objective of which is to ensure that a convicted
person would not breach regulations regarding sentence serving regime, it seems
logical and evident to restrict communication of such convicted person with
private persons. The Saeima emphasized that the Contested Norm does not include
a prohibition to communication with the family. A person is held in a disciplinary
punishment isolation cell for a short term, which does not exceed 15 days. The
convicted persons located in a disciplinary punishment isolation cell can
receive all letters and send telegrams without any restriction. Consequently,
convicted persons held in a disciplinary punishment isolation cell are ensured
with minimum communication with relatives and other persons.
According to the Saeima, the
prohibition to send letters to private persons established for convicted
persons held in a disciplinary punishment isolation cell is necessary and shall
be regarded as a proportionate instrument if compared with the gravity of the
offence. There exist no other ways of ensuring isolation of convicted persons
indispensible to achieve his or her submission to the requirements of serving a
punishment. Consequently, restriction established in the Contested Norm
complies with the principle of proportionality.
Taking into account the
aforesaid, the Saeima asks the Court to recognize Section 74 (1) as compliant
with Article 96 and Article 104 of the Satversme.
5. The institution that issued the Contested Norm of
the regulations, the Cabinet of Ministers indicates that the rights
guaranteed in Article 94 and Article 104 of the Satversme can be restricted if
the restriction is provided by law, it has a legitimate objective and is
proportional. The Regulation No. 423 has been adopted based on Section 11 (5)
and Section 47 (1) of the Code. Namely, the Regulation was adopted in
accordance with the authority delegated to the Cabinet of Ministers by law.
Consequently, Section 88 of the Regulation No. 423 has been adopted in
accordance with law.
However, Section 88 of the
Regulation No.423 in the wording effective at the moment when the case was
initiated was in conflict with Section 74 (1) of the Code because it restricted
the rights established in the Code. Namely, the Code provided for a restriction
to convicted persons held in a disciplinary punishment isolation cell to send
letters to private persons, whilst Section 88 of the Regulation No. 423
provides for a general restriction to receive and send letters, except for
complaints and application to prosecutor’s office or the Head of the Latvian
Prison Administration. Consequently, according to Section 15 (6) of the
Administrative Procedure Law, Section 88 of the Regulation No. 423 shall not be
applicable and could not serve as the grounds for restricting the human rights.
To prevent non-compliance of
Section 88 of the Regulation No. 423 with Section 74 (1) of the Code, the
Regulation No. 413 was adopted. The latter Regulation provided for a new
wording of Section 88 of the Regulation No. 423. The present wording of this
Section does not include any restriction of rights established in Article 96
and Article 104 of the Satversme. Consequently, the Cabinet of Ministers asks
the Constitutional Court to terminate proceeding in the part of the case
relating to compliance of Article 88 of the Regulation No. 423 with Article 96
and Article 104 of the Satversme.
6. The summoned person – the Ombudsman of the Republic of Latvia (hereinafter
– the Ombudsman) indicates that the prohibition to send letters to private
persons established in Section 74 (1) of the Code does not have a legitimate
objective. Article 8 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (hereinafter – the European Human Rights
Convention) and Section 24.2 of the European Prison Rules provide for
particular cases when it is allowed to restrict the right of persons to
communicate. However, in any case it is necessary to provide for a possibility
to communicate at least at the minimum level.
It is necessary to take into
account the fact that the legitimate objectives established in the European
Prison Rules and Article 116 of the Satversme are reached by censoring communication
of the convicted persons in accordance with Article 41 of the Code. However, if
they are fully denied the right to communicate with private persons, the right
of persons to private life are being restricted. Likewise, this prohibition,
namely, the prohibition to communicate with private persons, is not necessary
in a democratic society. The prohibition to receive letters from State and
local government institutions neither has a legitimate objective and it is not
necessary in a democratic society.
7. The
Latvian Prison Administration informs
that convicted persons held in a disciplinary punishment isolation cell do not
have the possibility to communicate with the relatives before the release and
that letters, postal parcels, consignments and packages addressed to the
convicted persons held in a disciplinary punishment isolation cell are handed
to them after the release from the isolation cell. Likewise, convicts held in a
disciplinary punishment isolation cell cannot send telegrams to private
persons.
Communication of convicts is
paid by the convicts themselves. Only costs for the communication of the
convicts established in Section 50 (3) and (4) of the Code are covered from the
budget of the place of deprivation of liberty. However, communication of
convicts with State and local government institutions is paid from the budget
resources of the place of deprivation of liberty if the convicted person does
not have any resources at his or her disposal and the convict contests an
administrative act or factual activities of these authorities or sends an
application requesting State provided legal assistance.
The Constitutional Court has concluded:
8. The Constitutional Court has initiated the case
on compliance of the Contested Norms with both, Article 96 and Article 104 of
the Satversme.
9. Article 104 of the Satversme provides the following: „ Everyone has the right to address submissions to
State or local government institutions and to receive a materially responsive
reply. Everyone has the right to receive a reply in the Latvian language.” The Constitutional Court has initiated a case on compliance of the
Contested Norms with the entire Article 104 of the Satversme. However, it can
be concluded from the application that the Applicant asks to assess compliance
of the Contested Norms with the first sentence of Article 104 of the Satversme
insofar as it provides for the rights to address submissions to State and local
government institutions. Consequently, the Constitutional Court shall assess
compliance of the Contested Norms with Article 104 of the Satversme.
The Constitutional Court
shares the opinion of the Saeima and the Cabinet of Ministers, namely, that
Section 74 (1) of the Code does not prohibit the convicts held in a disciplinary
punishment isolation cell to send letters to State and local government
institutions and to receive letters from the above mentioned institutions. It
is only prohibited to send letters to private persons, as well as to receive
consignments, parcels and postal parcels. Consequently, Section 74 (1) of the
Code does not deny the right to convicted persons held in a disciplinary punishment
isolation cell to send letters to State and local government institutions or to
receive letters from the above mentioned institutions.
On 6 February 2006, the
Constitutional Court adopted a judgment in the case No. 2005-17-01 “On the Compliance of the Words “to Send Letters”
Included in Section 74 (the First Part) of the Latvian Penalty Execution Code
with Articles 89, 92 and 104 of the Satversme”. At the time when the judgment was adopted, Section 74 (1) of the Code
provided, among the rest things, a prohibition for the convicts held in a disciplinary
punishment isolation cell to send letters. It was concluded in the judgment
that the words “to send
letters”, which are included in Section 74 (the first Part) of the Code forbid
the convicted person to send letters only to private persons, but does not
restrict his/her correspondence with courts and other State and local authority
institutions (see: Judgment of 6 February
2006 by the Constitutional Court in the case No. 2005-17-01, Para 8.2). The present wording of Section 74 (1) of the Code provides that the
prohibition shall apply only to sending letters to private persons and
therefore it does not the right of the Applicant to address State and local
government institutions, as provided for in Article 104 of the Satversme.
The Constitutional Court also
indicates that the interpretation of Section 74 (1) of the Code offered by the
Latvian Prison Administration is erroneous insofar as it applies to receiving
of letters sent by State or local government institutions.
It is not possible to agree
with the opinion of the Latvian Prison Administration that letters from State
or local government institutions should be handed to the convicted persons held
in a disciplinary punishment isolation cell only after their release from the
isolation cell. Section 49 (3) of the Code shall be applicable to the above
mentioned convicted persons. This Section provides that letters addressed to the
convicts shall be handed over to them by the administration of the place of
deprivation of liberty no later than within three days from the date of
reception or passing over of a letter. This also applies to letters sent by
State or local government institutions.
Consequently, Section 74 (1) of the Code does not restrict the rights of a
person guaranteed in Article 104 of the Satversme and complies with Article 104
of the Satversme.
10. The case under review was also initiated with a view
to examine compliance of Section 88 of the Cabinet of Ministers Regulation No.
423 with Article 96 and Article 104 of the Satversme.
On 12 May 2009, the Cabinet of
Ministers adopted the Regulation No. 413 that provided for a new wording of
Section 88 of the Regulation No. 423. The wording of Section 88 of the
Regulation No. 423 effective at the time when the case was initiated provided
that convicted persons held in a disciplinary
punishment isolation cell shall have
the right to send letters to and receive letters from the prosecutor’s office
or the Head of the Latvian prison Administration. However, the present wording
of this Section provides that based on a request of the convicted person, he or
she shall be provided with the possibility to send and receive letters from
private persons.
Item
2 of the first part of Article 29 of the Constitutional Court Law provides, that proceedings in the case may be closed before
the judgment is announced by a decision of the Constitutional Court if the
disputed legal norm (act) is no longer in effect. The abovementioned has been
established in order to ensure economy of the Constitutional Court process and
that the Constitutional Court would not render judgment in cases where a
dispute no more exists (see: Judgment of
12 February 2008 by the Constitutional Court in the case No. 2007-15-01, Para 4).
Therefore the Constitutional Court shall assess whether there exist
considerations that would require continue proceedings in the case.
Unlike the wording of Section
88 of the Regulation No. 423 that was effective at the time when the case under
review was initiated, the present wording of the above mentioned Section
provides that based on a request of a convicted person held in a disciplinary
punishment isolation cell, the place of deprivation of liberty shall provide
them the possibility to send letters, except for sending letters to private
persons, in accordance with the procedure established in the normative
regulatory acts. It follows from the above mentioned norm and Section 71 (1) of
the Code that Section 88 of the Regulation No. 423 according to the wording of
the Regulation No. 413 does not restrict communication of convicted persons
held in a disciplinary punishment isolation cell with courts and other State and
local government institutions and complies with Article 104 of the Satversme.
Consequently, it can be concluded that the Cabinet of Ministers has prevented
the dispute on compliance of Section 88 of the Regulation No. 423 with Article
104 of the Satversme and the proceedings in this part of the case shall be
terminated.
In the event if a contested
norm is amended before the judgment is adopted, the Constitutional Court shall
have the right to continue proceedings in case if termination of the case would
not allow examining claim of the Applicant on its merits (see, e.g.: Judgment of 12 June 2002 by the Constitutional Court in the
case No. 2001-15-03). The former and the present wording of Section 88 of
the Regulation No. 423 prohibit convicted persons held in a disciplinary punishment
isolation cell to send letters to private persons. The Constitutional Court
concludes that if the proceedings regarding compliance of Section 88 of the
Regulation No. 423 with Article 96 of the Satversme were terminated, then the
claim of the Application on compliance of the prohibition to send letters to
private persons would not be assessed.
Consequently,
the proceedings in the part of the case regarding compliance of Section 88 of
the Regulation No. 423 (the wording of 3 June 2006) with Article 104 of the
Satversme shall be terminated, whilst the proceedings in the part of the case
regarding compliance of the effective wording of Section 88 of the Regulation
No. 423 with Article 96 of the Satversme shall be continued.
11. Article 96 of the Satversme provides: “Everyone
has the right to inviolability of his or her private life, home and
correspondence.”
It follows from the
application that the Applicant asks to assess compliance of the prohibition
included in the Contested Norms, namely, the prohibition to send letters to
private persons, with the right to family life. Although Article 96 of the
Satversme expressis verbis
provides only for the rights to inviolability of private life, the
Constitutional Court has concluded that the right to inviolability of private
right included in Article 96 of the Satversme includes also the right to
inviolability of family life and the right to maintain relations with family
members and other persons guaranteed in Article 110 of the Satversme. Moreover, not only the duty of the State to refrain
from intervention into private life, but also the duty of the State to carry
out necessary activities to secure these rights follows from the abovementioned
right (see: Judgment of 23 April 2009 by the
Constitutional Court in the case No. 2008-42-01, Para 8 and Para 10).
12. When assessing compliance of the Contested Norms
with Article 96 of the Satversme, first it is necessary to establish whether
the Contested Norms restrict or not the fundamental rights of the Applicant
established in this Article of the Satversme.
It is possible to agree with
the opinion of the Saeima that the right of persons in custody to private life
are not equal with the same right of persons in freedom. The rights of these
persons to communicate with family members and other persons are being
restricted in accordance with the form of a place of deprivation of liberty.
Communication with family members and other persons is one of the ways how a
person can maintain relations with family members. If a person is denied the
possibility to send letters to their family members, it is denied the
possibility to maintain relations with them.
12.1. Section 74 (1) of the Code provide that convicted persons who are held in a disciplinary punishment isolation cell shall
not have the right to have meetings, receive consignments, parcels and postal
parcels, to purchase foodstuffs, send letters to private persons and use table
games; they shall also be prohibited smoking.
Although the Code does not
provide for a definition of the term “private person”, it is possible to
conclude, when interpreting systematically norms included in the Code, that the
term “private person” also includes family members. The Code does not provide
for any other special legal norm that would ensure convicted persons held in a disciplinary
punishment isolation cell wish a possibility to send letters to family members.
Moreover, the prohibition to send letters to private persons is just one of the
restrictions of the rights included in Section 74 (1) of the Code.
Consequently, this is not Section 74 (1) of the Code but the only its words “to
send letters to private persons” that prohibits a convicted person held in disciplinary
punishment isolation cell to send letters to their family members. It also
follows from the application that the Applicant asks the Constitutional Court
to only assess constitutionality of the words “to send letters to private
persons” of Section 74 (1) of the Code.
12.2. Section 88 of the Regulation No. 423 (the wording
of the Regulation No. 413) provides for the right of convicted persons
held in a disciplinary punishment isolation
cell to send letters to State and local
government institutions, as well as a prohibition to send letters to private
persons.
This Contested Norm expressis verbis
provides that convicted persons held in a disciplinary punishment isolation cell
are denied the right to send letters to private persons. However, it follows
from the former wording of Section 88 of the Regulation No. 423 and Section 74
(1) of the Code that the present wording of Section 88 of the Regulation No.
423 prohibits a person sending letters to private persons. Therefore it can be
concluded that, in fact, these are the words “except for sending letters to
private persons” of the present wording of Section 88 of the Regulation No. 423
that prohibit a convicted persons held in disciplinary punishment isolation cell
sending letters to private persons.
Consequently, the words “to send letters to private persons” of Section 74
(1) of the Code and the words “except for sending letters to private persons”
of Section 88 of the Regulation no. 423 restrict the rights of the Applicant
established in Article 96 of the Satversme.
13. The rights of persons enshrined in Article 96 of
the Satversme are not absolute. Based on Article 116, these rights can be
restricted if the restriction is established by law, it has a legitimate
objective and is proportionate.
In the case
under review, there is no dispute whether the restriction included in Section
74 of the Code and Section 88 of the Regulation No. 423 has been established by
law, whether it has a legitimate objective and is proportionate.
14. According
to Article 116 of the Satversme, the fundamental rights established in Article
96 of the Satversme may be
subject to restrictions in order to protect the rights of other people, the
democratic structure of the State, and public safety, welfare and morals.
Placing
of a person in a disciplinary punishment isolation
cell has a legitimate objective, which
is ensuring that a person would no more breach the regime of serving one’s
sentence and ensuring good order and security in a place of deprivation
of liberty. As the Constitutional Court
has concluded, restrictions of the rights of a convicted person established for
a certain period of time when the person is held in a disciplinary punishment
isolation cell should also be
oriented towards execution of penalty and ensuring of the regime for executing
penalty (see: Judgment of 6 February 2006
by the Constitutional Court in the case No. 2005-17-01,
Section 70 of the Code
provides hat a convicted
person can be punished for non-observance of the requirements of regime of
serving one’s sentence. Placing in a disciplinary punishment isolation cell is one of the greatest punishments that can be inflicted to a
convicted person for gross or systematic offences of the regime of serving
one’s sentence, and this is related not only with separation of a person from
other convicted persons, but also other restrictions of rights, including the
prohibition to send letters to private persons. As it follows from Section 70
(4) and (5) of the Code, gross and systematic offences of the regime of serving
one’s sentence are offences that considerably hamper observance of the rights
and ensuring of security of other convicted persons and employees of the place of deprivation of liberty, as well as a good order in the place of deprivation of liberty.
As
the Constitutional Court has already concluded, the aim of such additional restrictions to disciplinary
punishment is the necessity of guaranteeing discipline and order at the
institutions of deprivation of liberty (see:
Judgment of 6 February 2006 by the Constitutional Court in the case no.
2005-17-01, Para 6 and Judgment of 7 October 2009 in the case No. 2009-05-01,
Para 14). The prohibition to send letters to private persons shall be
regarded as such restriction of rights, the objective of which is to prevent repetitive
crimes and thus guarantee good order and security in the place of deprivation of liberty.
The
European Prison Rules were adopted to provide the possibility to the Member
states of the Council of Europe to guide themselves by the principles included
in their legal acts and practice. Although the formal status of the Regulations
is to recommend guidelines to the administrations of imprisonment places, they
charge the Member States, which have adopted the Regulations with strict moral
and political duties” (see: Judgment of 19 December 2001 by the
Constitutional Court in the case No. 2001-05-03, Para 6 of the Concluding Part
and Judgment of 21 October 2008 in the
case No. 2008-02-01, Para 9.1) Article 24.2 of the European Prison Rules
provides among the rest things that communication with family members and other persons may be subject to
restrictions and monitoring necessary for the maintenance of good order, safety
and security.
It is not
possible to agree with the opinion of the Ombudsman that the prohibition to
send letters to private persons does not have any of the legitimate objectives
indicated in Article 116 of the Satversme. The aim of such prohibition is to
guarantee order and safety in a place of
deprivation of liberty and
thus to protect security of the society.
Consequently, the prohibition to send
letters to private person does have a legitimate objective – ensuring of the
regime of serving one’s sentence in places of deprivation of liberty and
security of the society.
15. Holding of a person in a place of deprivation of liberty and
regime of serving one’s sentence is related with restriction of the rights of a
person. If a convicted person breaches the regime of serving the sentence, the
punishment inflicted and all supplementary restrictions should be of the nature
preventing repetitive offences of the regime of serving one’s sentence.
According to the
Constitutional Court, the restriction of right that includes a prohibition to
send letters to private persons is appropriate for reaching the legitimate objective.
The above mentioned restriction makes a convicted persons understand the
unacceptable character of his or her activities and prevent the convicted
person from breaching the regime for serving the sentence. The Saeima has also
indicated that, when holding a person in a disciplinary punishment isolation cell,
it is only logical and self-evident to restrict person’s communication with
private persons.
Consequently, the prohibition to send letters to private persons is
appropriate for reaching the legitimate objective.
16. To ensure discipline and good order in a place of deprivation of liberty and
to punish a person for breaching the regime of the place of deprivation
of liberty, it is necessary to provide
for certain restrictions of rights. Taking into account the fact that a
punishment, namely, holding of a person in a disciplinary punishment
isolation cell can be inflicted only in
the case of gross or systematic offences of the regime of serving one’s
sentence; moreover, additional restrictions can be provided for convicted
persons held in a disciplinary punishment isolation cell. According to the opinion of the
Constitutional Court, the prohibition to send letters to private persons is one
of such supplementary prohibitions.
Article 60 of the European
Prison Rules provides for the main principles that should be observed when
inflicting punishment for a convicted person in the case of disciplinary
offence. It follows from Article 60 (4) of the European Prison Rules that punishment inflicted to a convicted person for
disciplinary offences shall not include a total prohibition on family contact.
Consequently, it is possible
to conclude that communication with family and relatives can be restricted and
such restriction shall be regarded as proportional provided that the convicted
person is provided with the minimum level of communication. Therefore the
Constitutional Court must establish whether the normative acts ensure a
convicted person held in disciplinary punishment isolation cell with the minimum
communication level with his or her family members.
17. The prohibition to send letters to private
persons and the only restriction of the rights that applies to possibilities of
a convicted person held in disciplinary
punishment isolation cell to communicate
with family members. The opinion of the Applicant and that of the Latvian
Prison Administration that a convicted person held in disciplinary punishment
isolation cell is denied any
communication with the family is ungrounded.
Section 74 of the Code
provides for restrictions of the rights that can be applied to convicted
persons held in a disciplinary punishment isolation cell. The prohibition of
having visits and the prohibition to send letters to private persons are
regarded as restriction of the rights restricting the possibilities of a person
to communicate with his or her family or other persons. It has not been
indicated in the abovementioned norm that a convicted person is denied the
right to use other forms of communication.
The Contested Norm prohibits a
contested person held in a disciplinary punishment isolation cell to send
letters to private persons; however it does not deny the right to receive
letters sent by private persons. Convicted persons held in disciplinary
punishment isolation cells have the right established in Section 49 (1) of the
Code, namely, the right to receive letters without restriction to the amount.
The general legal regulation
regarding telegrams and telephone conversations shall also apply to convicted
persons held in a disciplinary punishment isolation cell. Namely, under Section
49 (1) of the Code, convicted persons have the right to send, and receive telegrams
without restriction to their amount, whilst Section 49 (6) of the Code provides
that convicted persons have the right to have telephone conversations at their
expense or at the expense of the addressee in the amount compliant with the
amount established at the particular place of deprivation of liberty and level
of the regime of serving one’s sentence.
After adoption of the Code,
technical possibilities and ways of sending telegrams have changed. Initially
sending of telegrams was ensured by the
administration of the place of deprivation of liberty, but not this service is
provided by the State joint stock company “Latvijas Pasts”. For a person to be able to send a telegram, it should
dictate the text by telephone and to pay for the respective service. Price for
sending a telegram depends on the number of words and urgency of the telegram.
Consequently, it is technically possible to send telegrams. A convicted person,
when held in a disciplinary punishment isolation cell, can exercise the rights
established in normative acts and send telegrams. Use of a telephone for
sending a telegram shall not be regarded as a telephone conversation in the
meaning of the Code.
The Constitutional Court
agrees with the Saeima that holding of a person in a disciplinary punishment
isolation cell is a short term punishment. Therefore the prohibition to
communicate with family members by letters is applied for a short term.
Moreover, convicted persons held in a disciplinary punishment isolation cell
have the right to send and receive telegrams. The above mentioned convicted
persons also have the right to receive letters and to have telephone
conversations at the amount established by law.
Consequently, it is possible to conclude that normative acts ensure
convicted persons with the minimum communication level with family members even
if the convicts are held in a disciplinary punishment isolation cell. When
prohibiting a person held in disciplinary punishment isolation cell to send
letters to private persons, the State has not breached the duty that follows
from Article 96 of the Satversme.
The Constitutional Court
Based on Article 30 – 32 of
the Constitutional Court Law
h o l d s :
1. Section
74 (1) of the Latvian Penalty Execution code and Section 88 of 30 May 2006
Cabinet of Ministers Regulations No. 423 “Regulations Regarding Internal
Rules of Order of Places of Deprivation of Liberty” (the wording of 12 May 2009
Cabinet of Ministers Regulations No. 413) comply with Article 96 and Article
104 of the Satversme of the Republic of Latvia.
2.
Proceedings in the case regarding compliance of Section 88 of 30 May 2006
Cabinet of Ministers Regulations No. 423 “Regulations Regarding Internal
Rules of Order of Places of Deprivation of Liberty” (the wording of 3 June
2006) with Article 104 of the Satversme shall be terminated.
The Judgment is final and not
subject to appeal.
The Judgment shall come into
force on the date of publishing it.
Presiding
Judge G.
Kűtris
Translated
by Egija Labanovska, translator of the Constitutional
Court.